"Oi, mister! Indo-Aryans… it looks like I am Western after all! Maybe I should listen to Tina Turner, wear the itsy-bitsy leather skirts. Pah. It just goes to show,"said Alsana, revealing her English tongue, ""you go back and back and back and it's still easier to find the correct Hoover bag than to find one pure person, one pure faith, on the globe. Do you think anybody is English? Really English? It's a fairy tale!" 1 For Alsana, an immigrant from Bangladesh to the multicultural mosaic of London, there cannot be a real Bengali or Englishman in the hybrid, free-flowing, unpredictable world that she has experienced. She tries to tell her stubborn, traditionalist husband, Samad Iqbal, to live and let live, but he fears his family is losing its culture. To reverse the irreversible he makes a ferocious attempt to save his family, only to destroy it. What Alsana calls a fairy tale -the attainment or recovery of a fixed, pure, eternal identity --is a powerful and durable reality for her husbandand like many other fairy tales it shapes the world in which we live.
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I met up with this kind of desperate loyalty to ethnicity and an unalterable sense of nation most dramatically in July 1997 at a conference at the American University of Armenia in Erevan.
Returning to Armenia after a seven-year absence (a time in which Soviet Armenia became the independent Republic of Armenia), I entered a world I thought I knew but that had changed significantly. Armenians had gone through a decade of devastation, beginning with the struggle over Karabakh, an Armenian-populated region in the neighboring republic of Azerbaijan. This ethnically homogeneous and nationally conscious during the Soviet period and raised the question: how can Armenians (or Georgians and Azerbaijanis for that matter) reconcile the idea of relatively homogeneous nation-states with the realities of Transcaucasian politics and demography, which were formed by centuries of multinational empire and migration? Among ethnonationalists in South Caucasia the discourse of the nation -the notion that political legitimacy flowed upward from a culturally coherent community, "the people" constituted as a "nation" -had narrowed to the view that the people must be ethnically, perhaps racially, singular.
The result has been ethnic cleansing and killing, deportations and forced migrations, and a series 1 Zadie Smith, White Teeth, a Novel (New York: Random House, 2000), p. 196. 2 For accounts of developments in Armenia since the end of the Soviet Union, see Nora Dudwick, "Political Transformations in Postcommunist Armenia: Images and Realities," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 69-109; Gerard J. Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political people, turning blurry differences into more visible, seemingly unalterable differences. 10 For the post-Soviet states the Soviet experience, for all the efforts to eradicate it, has been an indelible influence. The practice of fixing nationality in each citizen's internal passport on the basis of parentage rendered an inherently liquid identity into a solid commitment to a single ethnocultural group. Young people with parents who had different national designations on their passports were forced to choose one or the other nationality, which then became a claim to inclusion or an invitation to exclusion in a given republic. In some cases people could opportunistically change their nationality officially, or change their names, to ease their situation in the national republics.
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More elusive as sources of identification, but perhaps most influential, are the selfgenerated subjective identifications that individuals make spontaneously and that stem from the most local locations -family relations, birth position in the family, sexual preferences, etc. Selfidentification is seldom a simple rational calculation but is deeply implicated in emotional attachments and subjective preferences. And, finally, identifications are influenced by the discursive context in which people find themselves, the pervasive narratives that surround them, giving shape to their perceptions and understandings of the world. Although identification "invites specification of the agents that do the identifying," as Brubaker and Cooper put it, "identification does not require a specifiable 'identifier'; it can be pervasive and influential without being accomplished by discrete, specified persons or institutions. Identification can be carried more or less anonymously by discourses or public narratives." 1996) ; and James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). 11 A young friend in Georgia with an Armenian mother and an Armeno-Georgian father (whose mother was Georgian but had his father's nationality, Armenian, on his passport) chose Armenian as his nationality. A gifted handball player, he was thrown off the Georgian national team when he refused a coach's demand to reclassify himself as a Georgian. 12 Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond 'identity', " p. 16. Narrative is central to identity formation, as Margaret R. Somers reminds us:
[I]t is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities….
[A]ll of us come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our own making.
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Somers goes on to specify four dimensions of narrativity: ontological, public, conceptual, and metanarrativities. Ontological narratives are about who we are and why we do what we do.
Public narratives are those attached to cultural and institutional formations beyond the single individual, to intersubjective networks of institutions. Conceptual narrativity are the concepts and explanations that are constructed by social researchers, such as "society," "culture," "structure,"
and "agency." And, finally, metanarratives or master narratives are the grand overriding stories in which we are historically embedded, such as stories of the nation, progress, decadence, or the end of history. 14 Identities, then, are always formed within broad discourses, universes of available meanings, and are related to the historic positionings of the subjects involved, which are themselves constituted and given meaning by the identity makers.
Some theorists are already asking (as probably some of the readers of this essay are as well): why bother about identity? Why indulge in so much theorizing about such a abstract and contested term? The payoff of employing the concept of identity is threefold. Sensitivity to the fluidity of identities, as well as the naturalizing tendencies of identity-talk, helps the researcher avoid, first, essentialism and, second, reification. Essentialism may be defined as the attribution of behavior or thinking to the intrinsic, fundamental nature of a person, collectivity, or state.
Identity theory proposes an alternative to essentialist models of people or social groups by claiming that rather than having a single, given, relatively stable identity, persons and groups have multiple, fluid, situational identities that are produced in intersubjective understandings.
Reification "is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products -such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is…experienced by man as a strange facticity, and opus alienum over which he has no control rather than as the opus proprium of his own productive activity." 15 Identity theory instead emphasizes the historical and contextual generation of both categories and their effects. In this approach human agency remains central to the production of identities. Third, identity as a focus of analysis displaces interest as the unmediated causal explanation for action. Instead of appealing to a notion of a universal social agent that acts because of inherent interests in predictable ways in similar circumstances, theories of identity propose that predictability from interest must consider the ways in which individuals or groups of people in similar social positions with similar experiences identify themselves, how stable or unstable that identity is, and how fractures or multiple commitments will affect ideas of interest.
This is an important move toward contextualizing, historicizing, and relativizing actions.
Interests themselves should be seen as tied to identities -what we think we need is linked to who we think we are -and are themselves affected by historic positions discursively constituted and embedded in narratives.
Although individual senses of the self may differ radically from one society or culture to another, it is possible to assert that there cannot be a group that does not possess some sense of shared commonality, even if just being in a certain room at ten past twelve, and a sense of difference with others, those in another room or with no room of their own. Cohesion of a group 13 Margaret R. Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relationship and Network Approach," Theory and Society , XXIII, 5 (October 1994), p. 606. 14 Ibid., may depend on the particular articulation of the sense of commonality, and here a sense of shared past experience, that is, history, becomes important as a record of what binds the group together and distinguishes it from others. Nations are particular forms of collectivity that are constituted by a process of creating histories. Just as there are few groups without a sense of continuity, so there can be no nations without a sense of its own history. History contributes in several significant ways. Like the genealogies of ancient and medieval kings, history provides ancestry that legitimizes present-day loyalties. The art of "seizing and recording one's own history,"
writes Natalie Zemon Davis, not only contributes "a deepened sense of identity" but "an affective-political gain in enablement." 16 National histories followed religious histories and borrowed modes and modalities from them. Both were written to advocate a particular sense of fidelity; light and dark images of the self and other distanced those within the fold and those outside; a sense of enemies, persecution, sacrifices, martyrdom, heretics, and true believers passed from the lives of the saints and the clerical chronicles to the stories of the nation. The longue durée of the past also gives this particular form of imagined community a potent claim to territory, the "homeland," which the people constituted as nation argues that it held first. The national history is one of continuity, antiquity of origins, heroism and past greatness, martyrdom and sacrifice, victimization and overcoming of trauma. It is a story of the empowerment of the people, the realization of the ideals of popular sovereignty. While in some cases national history is seen as development toward realization, in others it is imagined as decline and degeneration away from proper development. In either case an interpretation of history with a proper trajectory is implied.
Beyond the specific narratives of particular nations is the metanarrative or discourse of the nation, the cluster of ideas and understandings that came to surround the signifier "nation" in modern times (roughly post-1750 Though the nation may be divided or gradated along several axes, it is politically and civilly (under the law) made up of equals. All national members share common origins, historical experiences, interests, and culture, which may include language and religion, and have an equal share in the nation. The discourse of the nation both acknowledges that each nation is unique, with its own separate past, present, and destiny, yet recognizes the developmental process that gives every nation the conviction that the nation is always present, though often concealed, to be realized fully over time in a world of states in which the highest form is a world of nation-states.
The national may be in people unconsciously and may need to be brought forth or willed into consciousness, but in this discourse the nation is never completely subjective but always has a base in the real world. where local traditions emphasized loyalty to kin, clan, region, and close friends. 27 The highly centralized command system of the Stalin years loosened its grip on the national republics, and by the last decades of Soviet power nationalities experienced an unprecedented degree of local autonomy.
Nationality was institutionalized into the Soviet system as a category of identity, a passport to privilege (or discrimination), and a claim to political power in national republics.
Moreover, the idea of nationness fluctuated between a more contingent understanding of nationality as the product of historical development to a more primordial sense that nationality was deeply rooted in the culture, experience, mentality, even biology of individuals. Soviet theorists held contradictory views: that national differences would eventually grow less distinct and Soviet peoples would meld into a single Soviet people (the process of sblizhenie
[rapprochement] and sliianie [full merger]); and that nationality was passed on, like genetic traits, from one generation to another. The tension between seeing nations as ontological entities and conceiving of them as transitory and shifting is caught nicely by Slezkine's summary of Lenin's views: "Nations might not be helpful and they might not last, but they were here and they were real." 28 But, he goes on, "Insofar as national culture was a reality, it was about language and a few 'domestic arrangements': nationality was 'form.' 'National form' was acceptable because there was no such thing as national content. ethnogenesis of Soviet peoples. The famous "fifth point" in the Soviet internal passport, which 28 Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment," p. 416. 29 Ibid., p. 418. listed the holder's nationality, was based on parentage. 30 "Every Soviet citizen was born into a certain nationality, took it to day care and through high school, had it officially confirmed at the age of sixteen and then carried it to the grave through thousands of application forms, certificates, questionnaires and reception desks. It made a difference in school admissions and it could be crucial in employment, promotions and draft assignments." These patterns were quite unstable, however, and republics shifted from one to another.
In general democratic institutions and practices gave way to more authoritarian ones in Armenia, Soviet practice of ascribing ethnonational identities at the republic level had powerful popular resonance, but older patterns of clan, tribe, and regional identification undermined effective commitment to the nation in several republics, most notably Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. 33 The overriding identity with the Soviet Union, deeply ingrained in Russians in particular, gradually evaporated in the course of the 1990s, although not without regret and even resistance among the older, more conservative generation.
To illustrate the struggles over constructing national identities in the post-Soviet period, I
shall look at two polar cases -one in which national identity was largely a Soviet product and where linguists and historians are actively "recovering" and consciously constructing identities (Kazakhstan);and a second with an unusually strong primordial identity and a fierce opposition to notions of constructivism (Armenia).
Kazakhstan
When in 1992 political scientist Bhavna Dave asked her Kazakh informants about the "plight" of the Kazakhs, how they, their language and culture had "become marginalized" in their own homeland, she heard consistent responses: "it was the Soviet system, its unmitigated policy In the discourse of the nation culture is the source of political power. The right to rule belongs to the people/nation that is imagined as coherent, bounded, and conscious of its position as the foundation of the state's legitimacy. Specific territories are understood to "belong" to particular nations that either currently occupy those territories or have prior historical claims.
Soviet state practices spent much time and energy connecting specific peoples to specific territories, primordializing the nationalities of the USSR by employing anthropologists and historians to establish the original moment of ethnogenesis. Appearance of the ethnonym in travelers' accounts or other sources was often enough to conclude that a nation existed. For the Kazakhs it was eventually settled that the "nation" was formed in the mid-fifteenth century. 
Armenia
A people with a long written tradition (dating from the fifth century AD), with a past that includes numerous polities, dynasties, and continuous institutions (like the national church),
Armenians enjoy a rich repertoire of symbols, legends, and historical accounts with which to construct a modern national consciousness. In sharp contrast to Kazakhstan Armenia was the most ethnically homogeneous of the Soviet union republics, with a high level of literacy in the Armenian language, and no real challenge to its ethnic dominance of its own republic.
Armenians, however, were plagued by a sense of national danger. The republic was the smallest in the USSR in territory. Frequent migration from the republic, the loss of national sentiments theorists. 54 In this vision the Armenian nation is an historical constant, held together by blood, territory, religion, language, and history. As Shant put it, the individual cut off from the nation is like "a word outside a sentence; it has no role; and it has and does not have meaning. In order to receive a role and a certain meaning, to be able to express its real meaning and inner nuance, it must be woven into a sentence." 55 More mystically, Hovhannisian declares, "Not only the living, but also the dead speak in the national will. The past speaks, as well as the puzzling future." 56 Taking on the modernist, constructivist approach, Hamlet Gevorgian of the Armenian Academy of Sciences retorts, "What 're-creation' of historical memory is it possible to talk about in the case of a people who has continuously maintained and visited for sixteen centuries the memorial of the inventor of its alphabet, and whose main cathedral at Holy Ejmiatzin has been operating continuously for seventeen centuries…." 57 The antiquity and continuity of the Armenian essence is both a rejection of the denial of the reality of the nation repeated by both Marxists and modernists, as well as an implicit statement of the superiority of Armenian claims to territory and authenticity to those of more-recently constructed "nations" like the Turks and Azerbaijanis.
While from one angle historical writing in Soviet Armenia can be seen as part of a general marxisant narrative of progress upward from class and imperial oppression to socialist liberation, in the post-Stalin years scholars promoted an insistently national thematic.
Occasionally the regime would discipline the bolder voices, but Soviet Armenian historians space. 68 In a remarkable piece of research based on extensive field work in Armenia during the worst period of material and spiritual devastation (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , historical anthropologist
Stephanie Platz turned to the study of identity because "of its ubiquity and its power in shaping knowledge, experience and interactions in politics and in practice in daily life. repeatedly referred to the "time before" (araj) when Armenia was normal, people kind and hospitable to one another, when they had everything (amen ich kar), when the country was disciplined (kargukanon kar) and life guaranteed (garantia kar). 71 The nostalgia for the times lost, for a recent "golden age," was clearly a memory for a imagined, reconceived past but one that had been familiar, where life had been more predictable.
But rather than stemming from uncontested fixed characteristics, Armenian identity was fraught with ambivalence and could be employed with positive and negative meanings. 76 The Genocide has itself become an event so sacred that efforts by a few Armenian scholars to deviate from the accepted accounts of Turkish atrocities, to attempt to explain motivation for the massive deportations and massacres, or question the timing of the decision to eliminate the Armenians leads to accusations of (at best) incompetence and (at worst) of "accepting the Turkish version."
at the same time a traitor and an odar. Why would someone convinced that identities are constructed feel so deeply that something deep inside had been violated? And that he had been placed in danger in precisely the place he expected to feel at home?
Identification with the nation need not entail a move to primordialism, though, I hope to show, there is a selective affinity between nation, essentialism, and primordialism. National identity is an act of subscription to a continuous community with a past and a future, a shared destiny. Yael Tamir, the theorist of liberal nationalism, claims that national membership, "unlike membership in a gender, class, or region, thus enables an individual to find a place not only in the world in which he or she lives, but also in an uninterrupted chain of being. Nationhood promotes fraternity both among fellow members and across generations. It endows human action with meaning that endures over time, thus carrying a promise of immortality." 77 When they work, nations must feel like a community with powerful subjective identifications of individuals with the whole. While nations to some extent depend on free individual choice, as Margaret Canovan notes, "that choice is nevertheless experienced as a destiny transcending individuality; it turns political institutions into a kind of extended family inheritance, although the kinship ties in question are highly metaphorical." 78 Nation works most powerfully precisely when people are unaware that they have made contingent choices and feel that they are acting in accord with a natural order. Calculation is suppressed and feelings are heightened.
Like the idea of family, so the nation form provides clear boundaries of a community within which social goods can be properly distributed. In social science the very process of constituting a political community in the form of a nation has been seen as a necessity for democratic politics. Democracies in particular require a clearly defined, bounded population that then has the right to be represented. 79 Nation is a convenient and powerful form of identification that speaks precisely to these conditions. "Democratic discourse," writes Canovan, "requires not only trust and common sympathies but the capacity to act as a collective people, to undertake commitments and to acquire obligations." 80 While nationalism (because of its affiliations with revolution and the Left) was suspect in the minds of many Western policymakers during the first great decolonization after World War II, political analysts were even more troubled by tribalism and social fragmentation than they were with efforts of nationalists to construct new, coherent communities on the model of Western nations. Political integration of localities or tribes into coherent nations was part of the project of modernization, the prerequisite to democratization, lauded by its theorists.
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As sensible as the fluidity of constructivism is for theorists, in the actual world of group identifications and distinctions, a belief in sharp and relatively fixed distinctions between groups and predictable harmonies and homogeneities within groups gives a person an easy and reliable map of a complex and changing world. This kind of mental map provides a degree of predictability in an insecure world; it allows expectations of comfort with some and danger from others; and it permits different forms of treatment of those one considers like oneself from those who are considered different. In worse cases it licenses treatment of "others" in ways that one would not treat one's own. As the Armenian case demonstrates, essentialist articulations of identity are more intense paradoxically when identities seem to be threatened. Even though immutable identities should be the least threatened, as if unconvinced by their own rhetoric primordialist nationalists fear the loss of identity and seek actively to intervene to save it. And they attempt to save it precisely by shoring up the internal harmonies within the nation and policing the boundaries of national identity, sharpening the distinctions between those within and those without.
But the need for meaning, mental maps, or effective boundaries and collective commitments for polities only partially explains the power of the nation form and the turn toward primordialism. National identity, like others, is seldom purely about what is convenient or rational. Group or personal identities may be strategic starting points from which people act but they are also emotionally generated. Even in the Kazakh case the constructivist policy of the government must deal with the anxieties of cultural loss, the need for national pride, and the insecurity of a formerly colonized people coexisting with their recent colonizers. For Tamir the need for the nation involves a perception of shared fate that becomes an answer to the neurosis, alienation, and meaninglessness of modern times. Here again is emotion. The dread of personal oblivion, the need for redemption, salvation, eternity are all answered in the nation.
82
The nation need not have been primordialized historically, and yet over time it was, until primordial ethnonations became the dominant template for nations. If not in the first generation of nation-formation (the new revolutionary nations of France and the Americas), then certainly in the second and subsequent generations, the nation came to represent a primordial community that passes continuously through time. The category "nation," like those of class and race, acquired its own style of imagination, increasingly over time about deep, essential differences between nations and fixed, continuous cores within them -whether such distinctions or harmonies existed or not. Certain "objective" criteria of nation -language most importantly -provided the clear markers of boundaries, inclusion and exclusion. As Etienne Balibar puts it, "The illusion is twofold. It consists in believing that the generations which succeed one another over centuries on a reasonably stable territory, under a reasonably univocal designation, have handed down to each other an invariant substance. And it consists in believing that the process of development from which we select aspects retrospectively, so as to see ourselves as the culmination of that process, was the only one possible, that is, it represented a destiny."
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National identity construction has most powerfully been about a single, unitary identity, not a multiplicity of self-understandings, embedded in a long history and attached to a specific territory. The power of that identity lay within the discourse of the nation, which justified both territorial possession and statehood to those with prior and exclusive claims, based on language, culture, or race. In a world of competitors for territory and political power, primordialism was a practical, even necessary, solution to the difficulty of establishing such prior or exclusive claims. 82 The study of emotions and nationalism is just getting underway. See, for example, Roger Petersen, "Emotions and Nationalist Violence," unpublished paper delivered at Nations and Nationalism Workshop, University of Chicago, March 28, 2001, which will become part of his forthcoming book Ethnic Violence : Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Eastern Euopre in the Twentieth Century , to be published by Cambridge University Press.
Since prenational ethnic and religious communities do not map neatly with modern nations, and nations themselves are inherently unstable categories, primordialism and essentialism do the hard work of reifying the nation. Identities might be fluid but in the real world of politics the players act as if they are immutable, both for strategic reasons and emotional satisfaction.
If the irony of Soviet nationality development was that an anti-nationalist state helped create nations within it, the irony of post-Soviet states is that their determined efforts at creating to a particular piece of the world's real estate are allowed, then we can conceive of political communities in the future that permit cohabitation with shared sovereignties in a "national"
space.
